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Abstract - Access control refers to securing access to the 
resources and allowing access up to some defined level. This 
paper presents various approaches implementing access 
control in an open domain and carries an analysis of 
decentralized and diverse access control (DDAC) architecture. 
The DDAC architecture eliminates the role of centralized 
authority for managing and issuing users’ credentials. It allows 
the users to keep the right of disclosure of their attributes 
under the sole control of them and also ensures that the users 
are not able to modify the confidential credentials which have 
been registered and verified by various trusted attribute 
providers. This paper explains the metrics for carrying the 
analysis and then presents a theoretical and experimental 
analysis of the DDAC architecture. 
Keywords : Access Control, DDAC, Attributes, 
Credentials.  
I. Introduction 
pen and distributed nature of Internet assists 
users to use online services for the benefits of 
costs, time and efficiency. To avail theses 
services users are required to submit their credentials 
for the purpose of registration and further verification. 
The credentials supplied by a user may not be sufficient 
enough to grant the access to the requested service 
and a further verification may need to be carried by 
demanding some confidential and secret credentials 
from the user. 
However user may wish to disclose only basic 
set of credentials in the form of attributes and may 
decide to refrain from disclosing the confidential and 
sensitive attributes to service portals for the concerns of 
safety and privacy. This creates a requirement for 
trusted agencies, which can maintain private and 
confidential information of users and allow this 
information to be used by service providers without 
compromising privacy and security of user specific 
information.  
A significant research has been carried in the 
field of federated identity management, which makes 
possible to utilize the existing Identity management 
systems for realizing authentication and authorization 
decisions. In a federated system, Identity Provider (IdP) 
plays   an   important    role    and   issues  the   certified 
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credentials, which can be utilized at the service 
provider’s (SP) end. The scalability of such system is 
limited due to the need of IdP to act as a central 
authority and maintain credentials of ever growing large 
number of requesters.  
As more and more portals are offering online 
services, there is a strong need to provide 
authentication and authorization independent of any 
central authority. A decentralized environment must 
allow various attribute authorities to collaborate 
dynamically to produce a set of attributes, which are 
consumed by the service providers for providing 
services to the requesting users. The rest of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section II highlights various 
decentralized access control mechanisms. Section III 
describes in brief about the DDAC architecture and its 
components. Section IV presents the analysis of the 
DDAC architecture and finally Section V presents the 
conclusion 
II. RELATED WORK 
With the increase in number of service 
requesters and service providers, there was an increase 
in the complexity related with access management 
activities. The researchers started considering attribute 
management frameworks, which worked without 
involvement of any central authority to manage or 
process the users’ attributes. 
Cantor et al. [1], Chappell [2], Klingenstein [3], 
Jill et al. [4] approaches relied on IdPs and SPs for issue 
and consumption of attributes. The establishment of 
trust between IdPs and SPs required them to become 
part of the federated identity management. In federated 
system every IdP could define its own attribute release 
policy for each SP within the federation. The IdP had the 
full authority to decide about which attributes could be 
released to a particular SP based on the concerned 
access control policy. The service requester had no right 
to specify about attributes that could be released to an 
SP.  
Regina N. Hebig et al. [5] proposed a 
decentralized identity and attribute based access 
control approach. The authors described a prototype 
implementation with an architecture based on the 
standards XACML, SAML, WSPolicy, WS-SecurityPolicy 
and WS-Trust, which put the focus on sharing identity 
and attribute information across independent domains 
for the purpose of access control. 
O 
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A recent framework Aditi [6] for user centric 
identity federation enhanced the standard federated 
model with new IdP and SP components operated 
directly by users. These components were termed as 
user IdP and user SP, respectively to provide an 
interface between the user and the federation. In Aditi 
system, the user could obtain all attributes from the IdP 
and store them locally. Aditi addressed issues like 
redirection of user requests, use of cookies, removal of 
need for introduction of an SP to the identity federation, 
scalability, providing complete user control over his 
attributes, trust management in order to help the SPs to 
find out the trustworthiness of an IdP. In this approach 
all the attributes of the user were still kept with IdP and 
the user had to download all attributes from IdP to the 
card selector in order to utilize these attributes for 
authorization decisions. This provided users with full 
control over their attributes, which could be changed at 
the will of the user. Therefore ADITI framework was not 
well suited for service portals where users’ attributes 
were required to be verified without control of users over 
their own attributes and independent of any centralized 
authority.  
The problem evolved in relation to management 
of attributes in multiple federations. With the continuous 
and fast pace increase in the number of service 
requesters, the numbers of federations also increased. 
Each SP had to manage its linkages across multiple 
federations. This increased the complexity related with 
access management across multiple federations. 
Moreover, the IdPs still played the role of central 
authority for issuing and managing the attributes of 
users. There was a need for attribute management 
framework, which worked without involvement of any 
central authority to manage or process the user 
attributes.  
The DDAC architecture presented by Rajender 
Nath et al. [7] considered the use and verification of 
diverse attributes for supporting online services in a 
decentralized manner. It allowed utilizing diverse 
attributes without involvement of any centralized agency 
for management and issue of access related attributes. 
In the next section, we outline in brief about DDAC 
architecture and its components. 
III. Ddac architecture components
 
Fig.1.1 : Components of DDAC Architecture 
The DDAC architecture allows safe integration 
of users, service providers (SPs) and attributes 
authorities (AAs) for disclosure & utilization of the 
attributes. The DDAC architecture permits SPs to verify 
about the user’s attributes without involvement of any 
central authority. It eliminates the role of any central 
agency for issue and management of attributes and 
provides complete control over user’s attributes. Figure 
1.1 depicts the detailed view of the overall architecture. 
The DDAC architecture mainly comprises of 
four components such as (a) user attribute management 
(UAM) module (b) resource description search engine 
(RDSE) (c) web service interface (d) service manager. 
The UAM is a requester side module, which implements 
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three basic operations - attribute creation, attribute-
authority mapping, attribute storage. The RDSE provides 
both information collection and information retrieval 
functions for all SPs. It also provides the means for all 
trusted attribute providers (TAPs) to register their 
information, which is utilized by SPs to verify about 
users’ attributes. Each TAP provides a web service, 
which is accessed by the SPs, for verification of users’ 
attributes. The TAP provides the means for 
communication with the web service through a well 
defined service interface. The service manager is 
located on the SP’s end and is composed of six 
components such as (a) Policy Store (b) Controller 
Module (c) Users’ Registration List (d) Credibility Profile 
Level (CPL) Data Store (e) Credibility Verification Module 
(CVM) (f) CPL Computation Module. 
The policy store keeps information about users’ 
attributes along with the set of policies, which specify 
the rules and conditions under which access can be 
granted or denied. The Controller Module acts as the 
overall organizer for invoking and fetching response 
from the other components. Once a user sends a 
request for a service to an SP, the controller module 
intercepts the incoming request, invokes the credibility 
verification module (CVM) and directs it to process the 
service request. The CVM evaluates the registration time 
attributes against the registration list to verify whether 
user is already registered or not.  
The Users’ Registration List contains 
registration details about all those users who have 
already registered with an SP for accessing a service. 
The CPL data store contains the information about 
service access request related parameters. The CVM 
verifies the attributes against a data registry to check 
whether the requesting user is already registered or not. 
If the user is already registered, the CVM module 
invokes CPL computation module for calculating CPL 
value for the requesting user. Otherwise, the CVM 
module asks the user for registration and carries the 
verification through RDSE query. The CPL computation 
module computes the value for CPL based on service 
request related parameters 
The next section carries the analysis of DDAC 
architecture and presents the performance results. 
IV. Analysis of ddac architecture 
To analyze the merits of the DDAC architecture 
three main parameters have been identified such as (a) 
Performance (b) Time Effectiveness (c) Cost 
Effectiveness. The analysis of the DDAC architecture 
based on the above mentioned parameters is presented 
below: 
a) Performance 
The DDAC architecture is implemented using 
Java Framework. The portal interface has been deigned 
using Java Server Pages. The experiment is conducted 
on a 2.4 GHz Intel Dual Core Pentium machine with 1 
GB of RAM, Windows XP operating system. The 
attribute storage and retrieval services are provided by 
installing IBM Tivoli Directory Server for Windows on a 
remote site. A web service is implemented for receiving 
of verification request, query of attributes from Tivoli 
Server and generating response for the SP.  
The working of the architecture is tested for two 
different cases 
Case 1: For requests based on registration time 
attributes. 
Case 2: For requests based on registration time 
attributes & another set of attributes stored with TAP. 
The experimental details for first case are 
described as follows:- 
The experiment is performed for 100 requests, 
where each access request contains only registration 
time attributes. For each access request, the types of 
registration time attributes and threshold values are 
varied.  The CPL value is computed as per eq. 1, 2, 3 & 
4 and is normalized in the range of <1, 10>.  
 
Figure 1.2 :  Threshold Value vs. Number of Allowed 
Requests 
The obtained results as per figure 1.2 highlight 
that with the increase in threshold value the number of 
allowed access requests also decrease. At mid of the 
total threshold range, there is found a sharp decline in 
the allowed number of requests. A further increase in the 
threshold value results in the rejection of most of the 
number of access requests as their computed CPL 
value comes out as below than the permissible limits.  
The experimental details for second case are 
described as follows:  
The experiment is performed for 100 requests, 
where each request contains registration time attributes 
and another set of attributes, which are maintained with 
TAP. For each access request the types of registration 
time attributes and TAP’s attributes are varied. The 
experiment is conducted by varying the threshold values 
in the same intervals as in above presented case 1.  
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 Figure 1.3
 
:
 
Threshold Value vs. Number of Allowed 
Requests
 
As Per Figure 1.3, It Is Found That For The 
Same Threshold Levels; Most of The Access Requests 
Are Allowed. A Further Increase in the Threshold Value 
Results in a Steady Decline in the Number of Allowed 
Requests. At Maximum Level of Threshold Value, Some 
Requests Are Still Allowed. Thus it is found that the 
Ddac Architecture Performs Well as Compared to 
Existing Access Control Mechanisms.
 
b)
 
Time Effectiveness
 
The use of DDAC architecture results in 
considerable saving in time required to deliver the 
required products to the requesters. The computation 
and use of CPL values for access request allows an SP 
to establish some degree of trust with the requesting 
client. The degree of trust further increases with the AR 
and PDR values associated with the same client. 
 
The time effectiveness of the DDAC architecture is 
calculated as follows:
 
Assuming that there are N numbers of requests 
for purchase of products and out of total of N requests, 
for P requests the products are returned for valid 
reasons and for Q number of requests due to some 
defaults.
 
Total time T1 required to serve N requests, 
when no verification is carried, is computed based on 
time required to deliver the product  (TD), time required 
to receive back the rejected product (TR) and time 
required to receive back the product in case of a default 
(TU).
 
)(*)(* D1 UDR TTQTTPT +++=
 
Now, considering the case where the 
verification is carried based on CPL value, the time T2 
required to serve N number of requests is computed as 
follows:
 
 
)(*2 RD TTPT +=  
The use of CPL value, leads to elimination of 
time caused by Q number of defaulting requests. 
The time effectiveness value (TE), which describes the 
total saving in time, is computed as  
21 TTTE −=  
         The value of TE results in a significant amount 
of saving in time for the organization. 
c) Cost Effectiveness 
         The DDAC architecture allows an SP to verify 
about the genuineness and validity of service requester. 
The services are provided only after ascertaining about 
the details about the requester.  
         The method employed in the architecture 
considers CPL as one important factor for serving users 
requests.  The CPL is computed based on the service 
request related parameters such as the number of times 
requested items accepted by the user on delivery, the 
total number of items supplied, timely payment, number 
of times delay occurred during payments, the time delay 
in payment, the time allowed for payment etc. The 
values of these parameters for a user varies based on 
the past transaction details interactions with an SP. The 
DDAC architecture has been designed in a manner that 
it significantly reduces the request processing overhead 
based on the CPL value of a user. This results in a 
considerable saving in terms of costs of delivery. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a theoretical and 
practical analysis of the working of DDAC architecture. 
The DDAC architecture works well in a decentralized 
manner and provides means by which various attribute 
providers can dynamically collaborate to utilize users’ 
attributes. The concept of CPL in DDAC architecture 
leads to reduction in the time required to verify service 
requests, based on the users’ credibility values and 
previous experiences. The change in the value of one or 
more attributes can be easily carried by trusted attribute 
provider without any hassles of intimation to any other 
party. The trusted attribute providers only provide the 
location and signature of web service in resource 
descriptive search engine. The information about 
signature of web service in resource descriptive search 
engine remains unchanged and do not effect any 
operation even when there is a change in the value of 
one or more users’ attributes. 
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